

# **The Expression of Right-Wing Populism in the Netherlands across Facebook Posts**

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## **Funding Note**

This research was funded by the H2020 project *Democratic Efficacy and the Varieties of Populism in Europe* (DEMOS) under H2020-EU.3.6.1.1. and H2020-EU.3.6.1.2. (Grant agreement ID: 822590).

## **Abstract**

When it comes to political communication on social media, Facebook has arisen as one of the most important platforms. Recent research on populist discourses provides evidence for populist ideology fragments emerging across Facebook posts. Moreover, the level of populist language styles and the adoption of typical populist rhetoric appears to be 'endemic' across political actors across the whole political spectrum, even among non-populist ones. In total, 51 posts from Geert Wilders were analyzed before and 71 in the period after the 2019 Dutch elections (N = 122). This study tackles the use of the founding elements of populist communication strategies: references to the people, references to the elites, and references to the others. For a populist leader, Wilders' Facebook posts do not contain many references to the people. Instead, he focuses on the elites (e.g., the EU) and on the others (e.g., Muslims or asylum seekers). The clearest difference between the pre- and post-election period seems to be that Wilders gradually changes his populist communication strategies from a focus on the elites, to a focus on the others. In doing so, he uses more references to religion and blaming the others. He also refers more to people within the country (asylum seekers and immigrants) in the post-election period (36,6%) than in the pre-election period (23,5%). His posts show clear examples of populist nativism, while he paints a picture of a battle between the Netherlands and the EU (the elites), Muslims or asylum seekers (the others).

## 1. Introduction

The Netherlands has seen a rise of populist parties in the last decades, both on the right wing (*Partij voor de Vrijheid* PVV, *Forum voor Democratie* FvD) and left wing (*Socialistische Partij* SP) spectrum. The core element of the populist ideology that has been mentioned as a defining feature is the combination of an *advocative* position toward the people and *conflictive* one toward the elites (Wirth, Esser, Wettstein, Engesser, Wirz, Schulz & Müller, 2016; Wirz, 2018). In the words of Mudde (2009, p. 23): populism is “... a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the ‘pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people”. Hence, according to Mudde (2009) and others (e.g., Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove 2014), populists view the people as sovereign, homogenous, and virtuous. Another often mentioned element is that the elites are viewed as evil, whereas the people are considered good. This is referred to as a Manichean outlook, in the sense that the people are morally superior to the elites.

A fourth element that has recently often been discussed is nativism. Nativism focusses on the idea that one believes to have more rights to be treated fairly, and to receive priority treatments when living in the country where one was born. In other words, natives should have more rights than non-natives (e.g., asylum seekers, immigrants), because their ancestors built the country (see also Hochschild, 2018). The non-natives are treated as others in these views. The dream of a *White Europe* is a clear example of nativism within Right Wing populism. Thus, these aspects suggest that there are antagonistic relations between the people and the elites, but also between the people and the others. Most recently, Kešić and Duyvendak (2019) outline how right-wing discourses and issues of belonging and collective identity across Europe can be better comprehended through the logic of nativism, which is

categorized, in the illustrative case of the Netherlands, into three subtypes: secularist, racial and populist nativism.

## **2. The PVV and FvD**

In the Netherlands, the PVV (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*; Party for Freedom) is the oldest right-wing populist party, founded in 2006, with Geert Wilders as the leader and also the only member, as there is no possibility to become a PVV member. Hence, supporters do not have a say in the contents of the political program nor in the election of officers. Before the foundation of PVV, Geert Wilders was a member of the right-wing party VVD (*Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*; People's Party for Freedom and Democracy), which has been part of the country's government for many years since World War 2. When Wilders left the VVD in 2005, he founded his own party, the PVV, which has witnessed a steady rise until recently. He received 15.5% of the votes in the 2010 elections, which was the peak of his popularity, and his party eventually took part in the negotiations for a new government. They ended up as supporter of the center-right minority government, although they were not officially part of the coalition ('*gedoogconstructie*'). The coalition clashed in 2012 when Wilders suddenly announced that he would leave the negotiation table, and new elections followed. In the 2012 elections, Wilders lost nine seats and went from 24 to 19 seats. Many supporters seem to have realized that Wilders has a big mouth towards the government but is not capable to enforce or change anything. Klein and Muis (2018) furthermore argue that although Wilders receives considerable support from the electorate and his anti-Islam statements are often mentioned by the traditional media and during political debates, "all established parties ignore or criticize the PVV" (p. 557). After the events that led to the fall of the coalition in 2012, this sentiment became even stronger. Since then, many parties declared that they did not want to be part of a government coalition that also includes the PVV. In the last elections of 2019, the Netherlands has seen the rise of a new right-wing populist party,

FvD (*Forum voor Democratie*; Forum for Democracy), led by Thierry Baudet. This party has many young, male supporters and has received a large part of its votes from PVV voters. The PVV thus seems to be losing ground.

### **3. Populist Ideologies in the Netherlands**

Both Geert Wilders and Thierry Baudet display anti-Islam attitudes and Muslims are portrayed as ‘the others’ in statements of both. For Wilders this is his primary asset. His statements in the Dutch Parliament and on social media, are mostly about Muslims, and his plea is to ban Muslim fundamentalism from the Netherlands and Europe. He does not present a nuanced view about Muslims but argues that there are many extremists and terrorists among Muslims who want to take over the Netherlands, turning it into a Muslim state by applying the Sharia. He describes ordinary Muslims as terrorists or Jihad supporters, and he specifically targets young male Moroccans, who are known to have a higher crime rate than young males from other ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands. Baudet also focuses on other political issues, (e.g. climate change) and seems to have a broader populist discourse.

Regarding the EU, the PVV and FvD hold slightly different stances. Wilders has always been clear about the EU: he seeks a ‘Nexit’, meaning the Netherlands should leave the EU to take back control over immigration issues. Whereas Baudet also expressed a preference for a Nexit, his party does not: instead, the FvD wants a referendum about the Euro and Europe’s open borders, and to stop the expansion of the EU. Although they state that they are against the EU and are in favor of a referendum, they are far more careful when speaking about leaving the EU than Wilders. Party members of FvD disagree about their stance on Nexit: while party leader Baudet expressed a desire to leave the EU, other party members expressed that FvD is not necessarily in favor of leaving. Baudet responded by telling the media that he does not recognize himself or his party in these statements, and that he is against the EU, against the internal market, against the Euro and against open borders

(Dietvorst, 2019). Such disagreements are not expressed within the PVV, but this may also result from the fact that Wilders *is* the PVV and seems to be fully in charge of the party's viewpoints.

Baudet hardly actively uses Facebook and only published 3 posts during and 3 after the elections in 2019. Therefore, we will focus on the Facebook posts of Wilders in this report. What do his Facebook posts entail? The majority of his posts are about Muslims, or incidents including Muslims, specifically Moroccans ('Moroccan terrorists' as he refers to them). In 2014, Wilders spoke at a political meeting and asked his supporters whether they wanted more or fewer Moroccans in The Hague. He then yelled: 'What do we want? More or fewer Moroccans?' and the audience bellowed 'Fewer', 'fewer', 'fewer' for minutes. On the basis of this incident, he was prosecuted by The Hague court, for eliciting hate and discrimination of a whole group. His process still continues till today. His obsession with Islam and Moroccans is clearly reflected in his Facebook posts. Many of his Facebook posts merely contain more than one or two words, such as 'stop Islam', or 'Burka stop'. The latter refers to a much-discussed law that was proposed by Wilders and installed in 2019, which forbids wearing a burka in Dutch public places. Especially given the fact that there are only around 200 women wearing a burka in the Netherlands, this law is generally considered symbol politics and many mayors have said that they cannot and will not uphold this law.

His plea against Muslims is also embedded in a nativist ideology, which is illustrated by the subtitle of his political program: The Netherlands should be back in our hands ("Nederland weer van ons"). Whereas in his Facebook posts the others are Muslims, Wilders also refers to the elites, which is either the EU, the government, the public prosecutor's office or individual politicians. He mainly criticizes them for being weak and not competent to fight the increasing influence of Muslim culture and politics in the Netherlands. For example, he fiercely criticized that Muslimas can have swimming lessons in a protected environment in

the public swimming pool of Maassluis, which he sees as the start of a Muslim state. It went viral among his supporters on social media and the swimming pool had to hire security in order to protect the bathers against right wing aggressors. He also thinks that the state does not offer sufficient protection against the influence of criminal Moroccans, and he constantly claims that they should be sent either to prison, but preferably back to Morocco. He refers to these Moroccan men as the '*swimming pool terrorists*'.

#### **4. Social Media use by Geert Wilders and Thierry Baudet**

When it comes to political communication on social media, Facebook has arisen as one of the most important platforms. Recent research on populist discourses provides evidence for populist ideology fragments emerging across Facebook posts. Moreover, the level of populist language styles and the adoption of typical populist rhetoric appears to be 'endemic' across political actors across the whole political spectrum, even among non-populist ones (Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018).

Geert Wilders and Thierry Baudet both use several social media platforms. Both of them have the highest number of followers on Twitter, the platform they seem to be used most often, followed by Instagram for Baudet and Facebook for Wilders. In Facebook's Ad Library, an archive that provides details about paid ads by companies or political parties, we see that Wilders never used Facebook for paid advertisements. With more than 300.000 likes and high engagement levels (with a maximum of 1800 comments and 469 shares for one post), he may not have to. Although Baudet only posted six times around the elections, his posts are shared even more frequently than Wilders' posts: his pre-election post where he challenged Dutch prime-minister Mark Rutte for a one-on-one debate, was shared almost one thousand times. Considering his number of likes (around 45.000), his page seems to show higher levels of engagement than Wilders' Facebook page. Just like Wilders, Baudet does not use paid advertisements on his personal Facebook profile.


Whereas Wilders' personal page is far more popular than his party's page (314.000 likes versus just under 13.000 likes for the PVV page), for Baudet we see the opposite. FvD's profile has almost 200.000 likes, more than four times the number of followers Baudet has on the platform. This seems to fit their communication strategies: whereas Baudet is building a party with a big youth department, Wilders wants to remain the only member of the PVV and does not seem interested in expanding the party beyond his own persona. Klein and Muis (2018) furthermore argue that Wilders keeps "tight control over all party communication" (p. 551), which might explain why he focuses more on his own page than on the party's page. When analyzing Facebook posts from Wilders, we notice that he not once mentions the party leader for the PVV in the European parliament. It is all about Wilders, while other party members do not seem to matter. We do not find any paid Facebook advertisements by the PVV nor the FvD during the European elections, but it is clear that FvD started using paid advertisements a lot more since then (with thirteen paid ads in august). When it comes to paid advertisements, we can conclude that the use by Dutch populist leaders on Facebook is almost absent. This is in sharp contrast with other countries: in the UK, for instance, political parties spent 3.2 million pounds on Facebook during the 2017 election campaigns (Sabbagh, 2018), whereas Trump and Clinton spent a staggering amount of \$81 million during the 2016 presidential campaign (Wagner, 2017).

### **5. Populist Communication Strategies on Facebook: Geert Wilders**

In total, 51 posts from Geert Wilders were analyzed before the election and 71 in the period after the elections (N = 122). In this section we will focus on Wilders' use of the founding elements of populist communication strategies: references to the people, references to the elites, and references to the others.



**Chart 1: Use of Populist Communication Strategies (Geert Wilders)**




### **a. The People**

Interestingly, Wilders almost never talks about the people in his Facebook posts. The fight is between him and the elites, who does not stand up against the criminal and extremist Muslims. The people are mostly portrayed as the victims of Muslims, but they are not identified, and they are only explicitly referred to. In total, only 9% of his posts contain a reference to the people (*'our own people'* *'the citizens'*), with only a minor difference between the pre-election period (7,8%) and the post-election period (9,9%).

A higher number of posts contain a reference to an identity group (17,2%, *'the Dutch'* *'we'* *'voters'* *'Jews'* *'non-believers'*), although references are still quite vague and explicit, just like references to the people. The differences between the pre-election period (17,6%) and the post-election period (16,9%) are very small. Only 4,9% of the posts refer to a common fate or history (*'we are being deceived by Rutte and his gang'*), and just 0,8% a

reference to the heartland. When it comes to common fate or history, no references were made in the pre-election period (0%), whereas 8,5% of post-election posts contain a reference.

**Chart 2: References to the People – most used strategies (Geert Wilders)**




A larger share of Wilders’ posts refers to a similarity (10,7% *‘we are being cheated on’*), a strategy that is used more than twice as much in the pre-election period (15,7%) than in the post-election period (7,0%). In total, 10,7% of posts refer to geographical proximity (*‘Netherlands’ ‘the Dutch’*), of which 13,7% in the pre-election period and 8,5% in the post-election period. Only 0,8% of posts praise the people’s achievements or the people’s virtues (*‘Courageous Dutch people who defended their culture’*). 1,6% of posts demanded sovereignty of the people, with a reference towards the EU instead of the elites (*‘the Netherlands should be a free country again. No longer enslaved by Brussels! Down with the EU!’*). Much more of Wilders’ post include a reference to people as victims or victimization (13,9%), a strategy that was increasingly used after the elections (pre-election period: 9,8%, post-election period: 16,9%). A majority of these posts mentioned Muslims or Islam (*‘innocent victims were beheaded by [Muslims]’*).

## **b. The Elites**

Referring to the elites is by far the most common strategy of Geert Wilders (41% of his Facebook posts). Interestingly, this number is much higher in the pre-election period (49,0%), when almost half of his posts refer to the elites, compared to the post-election period (35,2%), although the proportion is high in both cases. In 31,1% of all posts Wilders discredits the elites, with a slightly higher proportion during the post-election period (32,4%) than during the pre-election period (29,4%). When discrediting the elites, during the pre-election period he mostly focuses on the EU (*'the EU is an attack on our national sovereignty'* *'Europhile Macron'* *'the EU monster'*). In the post-election period, the focus is more on Dutch politicians (one mayor in particular) or institutions (Public Prosecution Service). In 27,0% of his posts Wilders blames the elites (*'The EU makes deporting of criminal asylum seekers among which rapists, child porn lovers and murderers, impossible. Unacceptable. That's why #NEXIT'*). The number is around ten percent higher in the post-election period (pre-election: 21,6%, post-election: 31,0%). To a far lesser extent Wilders denies the elites' legitimacy to represent the people (4,1% in total, *'EU fairy tale D66 falls apart. Turns out to be a complete nightmare. Down with the fortune seekers! Vote PVV'*). Only 2,5% of posts contain visual information about the elites.

### **Chart 3: References to the Elites - most used strategies (Geert Wilders)**



### c. The Others

Compared to references to the elites, Wilders refers slightly less often to the others (38,5% in total). The difference between the pre-election (25,5%) and post-election period (47,9%) is remarkable and reversed when compared to references to the elites, a strategy that is used by Wilders more often in the pre-election period (49,0%) than in the post-election period (35,2%). Wilders thus seems to have changed his populist communication strategies after the elections.

As expected, most Facebook posts refer to Muslims, Islam, Moroccans, or asylum seekers when referring to the others in a critical way (*'criminal asylum seekers'* *'Muslim terrorist'*). The majority of these posts contain strong statements about asylum seekers (*'raping, child abusing, and murdering asylum seekers'*) or references (*'scum'*). Only 1,8% of posts refer to foreigners staying outside of the country (*'#AsiaBibi free now after leaving barbaric #Pakistan'*), while 31,1% of posts contain references to those already in the Netherlands, like asylum seekers and immigrants. For these references, we see a significant


rise over time: whereas 23,5% of Wilders' posts contain references to people already in the Netherlands before the elections, this rises to 36,6% after the elections (with a focus on *'Moroccan pool terrorists'*, *'rape jihad'*, *'Islam'* and *'burqa wearers'*). Interestingly, he does not make any references at all about others outside of the country who could potentially come to the Netherlands in the future or are already on their way (refugees, immigrants). Wilders also does not make any references to the economically rich or the economically poor when referring to the others. Only 0,8% of his posts that mention the others contain references to political opponents; 4,9% refer to cultural or ethnical values or patterns.

29,5% of Wilders' Facebook posts contain references to the others in a religious way, mostly about Muslims, Islam or asylum seekers. This number almost doubles after the elections (36,6%) compared to the pre-election period (19,6%). Before the election, he focuses mostly on Islam and sometimes empathizes with Judaism or Israel:

*'The innocent victims were beheaded by them. Their great example Mohammed decapitated all (nearly 900) men of the Jewish tribe Banu Qurayza in the year 627 in Medina. Not much has changed. Unfortunately. #stopislam'*.

In the post-election period, he is exclusively referring to Muslims and Islam (*'Islamic grooming gangs'* *'rape jihad'*). Other strategies Wilders uses on Facebook are exclusion of others (23,0%, with minor differences between pre- and post-election period), discrediting of the others (20,5% in total, 17,6% pre-election and 22,5% post-election), and blaming the others (14,8%). Blaming the others also went up significantly after the elections (pre-elections: 9,8%, post-elections: 18,3%).

#### **Chart 4: References to the Others - most used strategies (Geert Wilders)**



When referring to exclusion of the others, Wilders mostly speaks about closing the borders and sending away asylum seekers, but he also advocates against the EU:

*'The polling stations are open! Vote against mass immigration, against Islamization, against the EU super state! Choose for the Netherlands, our own culture, and our sovereignty! Choose for collaboration with the heroes of Europe such as Salvini! CHOOSE PVV! #VotePVV #EP2019 #Nextit'*

When discrediting the others, he only mentions Muslims and asylum seekers, who are *'raping and murdering'* people. We see the same mechanisms when he is blaming the others, for which strategy he also focusses on *'criminal'* asylum seekers and Islam.

## 6. Leadership Style

Geert Wilders does not seem to use Facebook much for the construction of leadership. First of all, almost none of his posts contain references to communication strategies that are associated with the relation between a political leader and the people. Only 1,6% of his posts contain indicators of a paternalistic approach of the leader towards the people (*'We lost this*

*battle but we will win the game. For a better and safer Netherlands and against Islam. Full steam ahead! #PVV #PVV #PVV*). None of his posts contain indicators of a service approach of the leader towards the people (0,0%) nor indicators of the equality of the leader and the people (0,0%).

The others communication strategies are associated with visionary leadership in populism and are used by Wilders more often. 7,4% of all posts contain elements about his long-term vision, but it is especially the difference between the pre- and post-election period that stands out: before the elections, 15,7% of his posts contain elements about a long-term vision, but that number goes down to 1,4% after the elections. It thus seems like Wilders actively uses this strategy to attract more voters. All references he makes here are about the Netherlands, or about closing the borders to stop immigration. He paints the picture that the Netherlands is an unsafe place, and that you should vote for him if you want that to change. His main slogan to support that claim is 'Nexit' or '#Nexit'. Only 1,6% of his posts contain elements about stressing unconventional or risk-taking behavior. These posts are about Muslims who wanted to assassinate Wilders (*'This criminal and Islamic terrorist #KhadimHussainRizvi put a fatwa on my head to kill me. How can he be released??'*). No posts contain articulations about the need to reconstruct the past, which say that the leader is remaining faithful to a specific set of ideas, or the leader communicating his remembrance to his past by emphasizing that he is still thinking the same, sharing the same value or having the same political partners.

### **7. Analysis of Baudet's Facebook Posts**

The few posts Baudet shared on Facebook before and after the elections are of a different nature than Wilders' posts. In his six posts, he does not refer to immigrants or demonizes them like Wilders does. He instead uses Facebook for mobilization: either towards his voters, or towards the prime minister when he directly addresses him in challenging him for a one-

on-one debate. Two out of six posts are short messages that directly address voters, in which he announces party meetings. Two other posts are meant for prime minister Rutte. In these posts he explicitly states that he wants a debate outside of the Dutch public broadcaster NPO, and instead wants to broadcast the debate live via Facebook. Given the fact that he rarely uses Facebook in his campaign, this seems to be an interesting proposal. He furthermore treats the public broadcaster as part of the elites here. He further discredits the elites by asking Rutte if he dares to debate him. Although Baudet is critical of the elites, he has also been criticized for being elitist himself. He held his inauguration speech in Latin when he was installed in parliament, and his victory speech after the provincial elections contained references to poetry and Greek mythology. As Tempelman (2019) argues, by using sophisticated language Baudet shows that he is different from other populist leaders; he even called himself ‘the most important intellectual of the Netherlands’ (Niemandsverdriet, 2016). One of his Facebook posts contains references to an essay he wrote about Michel Houellebecq and the writer’s critique on liberalism. This is very different from Wilders’ clear-cut, easy to understand statements, that are clearly meant for the average Dutchman.

### **8. National Particularities**

The most remarkable aspect of Geert Wilders’ Facebook posts is the fact that he rarely refers to the people. Wilders thus has less of an advocative position towards the people, and mainly carries out his conflictive position towards the corrupt elites and towards the others. In the pre-election period, he often combines these groups in one statement: the others are Muslims or asylum seekers, and the elites is the EU, the Dutch parliament or Dutch political parties. Because of the elites, we cannot solve the problems that followed mass immigration. He also actively connects other Dutch parties or politicians to the European Union ‘Europhiles’, examples being the following:



*'VVD and D66 together with Europhile Macron on their way towards much more EU and less of the Netherlands. That means even more immigration and Islam, even more transfer union and even more power to Brussels. Choose the Netherlands. Borders closed. Our money for our own people. #Nexit #VotePVV'*

*'D66 defends EU rules that prohibit the deportation of murderous and raping asylum seekers. Unbelievable. #Next #VotePVV'*

Only two of his posts in which he blames the elites in the pre-election period are about other subjects than immigration, both are about climate policy. On his Facebook page, Wilders does not seem to adopt a pure Manichean outlook: although the elites is indeed viewed as evil, the focus is not on good Dutch citizens, but on evil Muslims or asylum seekers. In doing so, Wilders predominantly posts negative messages on the social media platform. He furthermore ends a high number of his pre-election posts with *'#VotePVV'* and *'#Nexit'*, and some with other hashtags (such as *'#closetheboarders* or *#stopislam*'). After the elections his focus shifts to Dutch politics and institutions, who then form the elites that are to blame for the problems following immigration. Wilders almost exclusively refers to Muslims, Islam, and Moroccans, the embodiment of 'the others'. While doing this, he does not seem afraid of being accused of being a racist – if anything, it might strengthen his arguments. This is in line with earlier research on Wilders' Twitter posts in 2013, that showed that he primarily used Twitter to post "inflammatory, anti-Islamic content (...) as a method to arouse supporters" (Blaquart & Cook, 2013, p. 3). Already then, he used Twitter almost exclusively to criticize Islam in a hateful way, proclaim anti-immigration messages, and to spread anti-establishment messages that were mostly anti EU.

Wilders clearly distances himself from Dutch politicians, who are considered part of the elites. He does, however, reach out to other populist parties in Europe (*'I'll be there. Tomorrow. Milan. Together with the heroes of Europe and Matteo Salvini in particular! Ci*

*vediamo domani! #VotePVV #StopEU*). He even mentions them in a Facebook post in the post-election period, when the PVV lost three seats the European Parliament:

*'Currently zero, and after Brexit one seat in EP. Disappointing result. Fortunately, our friends in Italy, France and Flanders have won a lot. Congratulations Matteo, Marine and Tom! The PVV will return as well. We have the best ideas. Looking forward to it! Let's get to work! #PVV'*

With these posts, Wilders clearly demonstrates that he considers himself part of the anti-EU group within the European Parliament.

## **9. Conclusion**

For a populist leader, Geert Wilders' Facebook posts do not contain many references to the people. Instead, he focuses on the elites and the others. The clearest difference between the pre- and post-election period seems to be that Wilders gradually changes his communication strategies from a focus on the elites, to a focus on the others. In doing so, he uses more references to religion and blaming the others. He also refers more to people within the country (asylum seekers and immigrants) in the post-election period (36,6%) than in the pre-election period (23,5%). His posts show clear examples of populist nativism, while he paints a picture of a battle between the Netherlands and the EU, Muslims, and the elites. He often combines references to Muslims or asylum seekers (the others) with references to the EU (the elites). He furthermore does not shy away from making harsh statements about Muslims or Islam, who are referred to as 'scum', 'rapists', and 'criminals'. He focuses fully on immigrants already in the Netherlands, and not on potential newcomers, such as Syrian refugees. After the European elections of 2019, in which the PVV lost all their seats, references to exclusion of the others, discrediting of the others, and blaming the others all increased. Wilders additionally does not seem to use his Facebook page for the construction of his leadership, although his pre-election posts contained significantly more references to his long-term vision than his post-election

posts. Because Thierry Baudet only posted six times during the election period, his posts were not used for our main analysis. A quick look at the data, however, implies that he does seem to use different strategies than Wilders does. More research is needed to explore the differences in style between the two leaders, and to examine whether Baudet uses his Facebook page more often for references to the people or if he also focuses on the elites and/or the others.

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